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Abstract
This paper accounts for informational frictions when modelling the time-varying
relationship between crude oil prices, traditional fundamentals and expectations.
Informational frictions force a wedge between oil prices and supply and/or demand
shocks, especially during periods of elevated risk aversion and uncertainty. In such a
context expectations can be a key driver of oil price movements. We utilize a variety
of proxies for forward-looking expectations, including business conﬁdence, consumer
conﬁdence and leading indicators. In addition, our paper implements a time-varying
parameter approach to account empirically for time-varying informational frictions.
Our results illustrate ﬁrstly that oil supply shocks played an important role in both
the 1970’s and coinciding with the recent shale oil boom. Secondly, demand had a
positive impact upon oil prices, especially from the mid-2000’s. Finally, we provide
evidence that oil prices respond strongly to expectations but the source of the
shock matter: business leaders’ expectations are positively related, while markets’
expectations are not strongly linked to oil prices.
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1 Introduction
Oil is a core source of energy for the global economy and essential for economic activ-
ity. Analysts and academics alike have sought to better understand the implications and
causes of the dramatic ﬂuctuations in oil prices since the 1970’s. Traditionally, oil price
ﬂuctuations were thought to reﬂect unexpected changes in oil supply, such as production
disruptions due to conﬂicts, co-ordinated supply constraints in producing nations, see
Hamilton (2003) and Jones et al. (2004). Subsequent research has argued that supply
factors were only one among many explanations and less important than previously be-
lieved (see the literature from Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a;
Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kilian and Murphy, 2014). Kilian (2009) has sought to disen-
tangle the relative contribution of supply and demand shocks underlying the evolution of
the real price of oil. He found that since 1973 major changes in oil prices were primarily
driven by demand factors. These factors included shifts in global demand for industrial
commodities and unanticipated increases in precautionary demand for crude oil. Tra-
ditional supply and demand fundamentals are clearly important; however recent papers
have considered whether market participants directly observe these fundamentals (see
Singleton, 2014; Sockin and Xiong, 2015). In particular, Sockin and Xiong (2015) high-
light that the presence of severe informational frictions could lead to confusion among
market participants about the strength of the global economy and oil demand relative
to supply. Therefore, it may be unrealistic to assume that producers and consumers can
directly and contemporaneously observe whether oil prices are fully consistent with actual
fundamentals. Without a contemporaneous link between oil prices and fundamentals, the
role of expectations becomes crucial.
Our paper extends the literature on identifying the determinants of oil prices by in-
corporating economic agents’ expectations on the state of the global economy. This issue
relates speciﬁcally to informational frictions but more generally to research in behavioural
ﬁnance and psychology, which argues that moods and emotions aﬀect individuals’ be-
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haviour and aggregate prices and quantities (see for example Akerlof and Shiller, 2009;
Gino et al., 2012; Garcia, 2013). However, this topic has not been extensively investigated
in relation to oil prices. To carry out our investigation, we account for a range of conﬁ-
dence and leading indicators which provide a broader perspective of the global economic
outlook. Widely used survey-based conﬁdence indicators shall therefore be adopted in
this study as a gauge the state of the global economy in the presence of informational
frictions.1
There are several important reasons why it is important to investigate the role of
expectations in the oil market. First, although supply and demand factors may be the
fundamental cause of oil price ﬂuctuations, expectations may be the proximate cause of
their movements. Second, expectations account for informational frictions and depar-
tures from the oil price suggested by fundamentals Sockin and Xiong (2015). Third,
expectations also account for the idea that oil prices exhibit forward looking behaviour,
which can augment measured demand especially at turning points in the economic cy-
cle. Furthermore, expectations are frequently emphasized in economics research, see for
example the New Keynesian Phillips curve literature, which considers the importance
of fundamentals and forward-looking behaviour in a goods price setting (see Gali and
Gertler, 1999; Byrne et al., 2013). Finally, expectations encompass the idea that there
has been increased ﬁnancialization of oil, since investors shall seek to maximise expected
returns based upon asset prices (see Cheng and Xiong, 2014).
Our paper adopts an empirical framework which considers whether the source of
expectations matters for oil prices. We have three diﬀerent expectational proxies: busi-
ness conﬁdence, consumer conﬁdence and market leading indicators of OECD countries.
Respectively they capture the expectations on future global economic outcomes from
business leaders’, consumers’ and aggregate markets’ prospects. Even though these ex-
pectations may be interrelated and contemporaneous, business leaders, consumers and
markets can act on a speciﬁc set of (imperfect) information that emanates from the state
1See, for example, Carroll et al. (1994); Bram and Ludvigson (1998); Ludvigson (2004); Bachmann
and Sims (2012); Christiansen et al. (2014); Caglayan and Xu (2016).
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of the economy, rational inattention, or the agent’s own asymmetric goals and strategies.
Figure 1 illustrates that while there are similarities between these sources of expectations
they do evolve diﬀerently over time. Therefore, it is important to ﬁnd out how oil prices
would respond to variations in diﬀerent economic agents’ expectations on the state of the
economy.
Moreover, this paper takes account of the potentially time-varying impact of funda-
mentals on expectations. There are reasons to believe that over time there may be an
unstable relationship between oil price shocks and the underlying drivers. For example,
China has signiﬁcantly increased its market shares of global commodities following its
rapid development and this may have demand eﬀects (Kilian, 2009; Frankel, 2014). Fi-
nancial investors’ risk-bearing appetite and the risk premium can vary over time (e.g.,
Acharya et al., 2013; Cheng and Xiong, 2014). There is also time-dependent volatility
in both world oil production and oil prices (e.g., Kilian, 2009; Baumeister and Peers-
man, 2013b). Importantly informational frictions may themselves change over time, also
leading to a decoupling of oil prices and fundamentals in periods of acute uncertainty
about the global economy. These characteristics imply a time-varying relationship be-
tween the underlying drivers and oil prices.2 To carry out our investigation, therefore
we use a time-varying vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) model with stochastic volatility
model to simultaneously model the evolving roles of both oil market fundamentals and
expectation shocks on oil prices for the period between 1974 and 2016.
Our investigation extends the existing literature by providing evidence that oil prices
respond to both traditional fundamentals and heterogeneous economic agents’ expecta-
tions over time. In contrast to prior research, we ﬁrstly ﬁnd that supply shocks arising
from unexpected changes in oil production played an important role in explaining changes
in oil prices. For instance, the negative eﬀects of oil supply shocks have intensiﬁed due to
the recent US shale oil boom (Kilian, 2016). Second, we ﬁnd that since the middle of the
2000’s oil prices responded positively and strongly to unexpected increases in demand,
2For example, Peersman and Van Robays (2012); Millard and Shakir (2013); Baumeister and Peersman
(2013a,b).
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possibly due to increased demand for industrial commodities from many emerging market
economies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that real price of oil responds diﬀerently to expectations
that arise from business leaders, consumers and aggregate markets. We also identify that
increases in business leaders’ expectations have a strong and positive impact upon the
real price of oil. On contrary, we ﬁnd that unexpected increases in consumers’ expecta-
tion negatively aﬀect the real price of oil. Our results suggest that there may be greater
complementarity between oil prices and ﬁrm production than household consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 formally presents our econometric methodology and Section 4 discusses the
data. Section 5 reports the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 6 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 Brief Literature Review
Changes in oil prices can be rapid, and large price swings severely impact commodity
importers, exporters and speculators. For example, higher oil prices may lead to lower
aggregate demand and production outputs, induce inﬂationary tendencies and higher
interest rates for importing countries; whereas a sustained decline in oil prices supports
the so-called “resource curse” hypothesis for commodity abundant emerging economies
(see among the others, Lu and Neftci, 2008; Frankel, 2014; Baumeister and Kilian, 2016).
Thus, a better understanding of the nature of oil prices and their determinants are crucial
for policymakers and the private sector and may lead to better decision making in areas
such as macroeconomic policy, risk and portfolio management.
The recent economic literature has contributed substantially to a better understanding
of the causes of oil price ﬂuctuations (see, among others, Lorusso and Pieroni, 2015). In
an innovative paper, Kilian (2009) disentangles the eﬀects of demand and supply side
shocks underlying the evolution of the real price of oil. He found that an increase in
demand for crude oil causes a large increase in the real price of oil, whereas crude oil
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production disruptions only cause a small and transitory increase in the real price of
oil. A large number of authors have also reported ﬁndings consistent with this global
growth arguments (e.g., Kilian and Park, 2009; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Baumeister and
Peersman, 2013a; Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Baumeister and
Kilian, 2016). They argue that the unusually widespread growth in global economic
activity after 2000 caused a substantial increase in demand for commodities, especially
from China and other emerging economies. This strong demand coupled with stagnant
supply led to a persistent increase in the real price of oil.
Another strand of literature focused on the role of expectations, as the extent to which
oil price ﬂuctuations are unexpected depends on how these expectations are formed. One
common approach to modelling oil price expectations is to consider the role of specula-
tive trading. In particular, a number of authors have highlighted the ﬁnancialization of
commodity markets and growth in positions of index speculators had signiﬁcant positive
impacts on the drifts and high volatilities of commodity prices between 2005 and 2008
(e.g., Cheng and Xiong, 2014).3 An alternative empirical strategy to detect speculative
eﬀects is through the level of inventory. According to the theory of storage, speculative
purchases arise in the physical market with the intention of storing it for future use in
anticipation of rising prices accelerate the futures price of a commodity, which in turn
would drive up the spot price as less of the commodity is made available for current
consumption. Hence, if momentum trading in ﬁnancial markets is a primary driver of
price trends in physical markets, one would expect to observe an upswing in speculative
holdings of inventories. Yet, there is lack of consensus as to the eﬀects of speculation on
oil prices. For example, a number of authors found no persuasive evidence in supporting
this ﬁnancial speculation hypothesis as the level of inventories did not surge before the
July 2008 peak in oil price (e.g., Fattouh et al., 2013; Kilian and Murphy, 2012). On
3The composition of participants in commodity futures markets changed dramatically over the past
decade. Traditionally, two major categories of investors are commercial hedgers (e.g., famers, producers,
and consumers) and non-commercial traders (e.g., hedge funds). However, since 2000’s there has been a
large inﬂow of investment capital from non-user speculators and passive investors in commodity futures
markets.
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the other hand, Kilian and Murphy (2014) found that speculative demand raised the
price of oil in the mid-2008, but there was no evidence of speculative demand pressures
between early 2003 and early 2008. Juvenal and Petrella (2015) found that both global
demand shocks and speculative shocks played an important role in explaining oil price
ﬂuctuations.
However, in a recent paper, Sockin and Xiong (2015) argued that the standard ap-
proach to modelling oil prices ignore important informational frictions faced by economic
agents. For example, the inventory-based detection strategy assumed that oil consumers
can observe global economic fundamentals and are able to recognize whether current
oil prices are too high relative to fundamentals. They highlighted that this assumption
can be unrealistic during periods of considerable economic uncertainty (e.g., the global
ﬁnancial crisis in 2008), when ﬁrms and consumers faced severe informational frictions
in inferring the strength of the global economy. They also argued that by ignoring in-
formational frictions we are likely to understate the eﬀect of supply shocks and overstate
the eﬀect of demand shocks, speculation can drive up commodity prices without neces-
sarily reducing commodity consumption and increasing inventory. Their work echoes the
ﬁndings of Singleton (2014) who highlighted the importance of accounting for agents’
expectations in explaining the commodity market boom-bust cycles.
In contrast to the existing literature, we link economic agents’ expectations on future
economic conditions to the crude oil market. Our paper also relates to the extensive
literature on behavioural ﬁnance. When we survey the literature, we come across an
expanding research area that examines the eﬀects of economic agents’ conﬁdence on the
behaviour of decision-making, institutions and markets. In their studies, researchers use
various sentiment or conﬁdence proxies including survey-based measures, market-based
measures and text-based measures. Survey-based indicators have long been scrutinized
for the information they contain on the state of the economy which is not already covered
in other well-used economic indicators.4 For example, Batchelor and Dua (1998) showed
4Note that the words of “sentiment” and “conﬁdence” can be used interchangeably.
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that Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment is very useful in forecasting GDP. Ludvig-
son (2004) suggested that measures of consumer sentiment contained information about
consumers’ future spending. Christiansen et al. (2014) found strong evidence that both
Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment and Purchasing Manager’s Index hold signiﬁ-
cant predictive power in capturing recessions in the US in excess of standard recession
predictors and common factors.
Furthermore, there is a large and growing literature which uses market-based mea-
sures and text-based measures to study its eﬀects on stock market. For example, Baker
and Wurgler (2006) constructed a composite investor sentiment index by using the ﬁrst
principal component of six sentiment proxies suggested in prior research and showed that
this composite index signiﬁcantly predicted the future stock returns.5 Schmeling (2009);
Bathia and Bredin (2013) both found that sentiment has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on stock
market returns across many industrialised countries. In addition, several authors con-
structed text-based measures of investment conﬁdence through sources such as media or
news. For example, Garcia (2013) found that news-based investor sentiment helps to
predict stock returns at the daily frequency, especially during recessions.
However, only handful of studies considers the eﬀect of sentiment upon the oil market.
Deeney et al. (2015) followed methods applied by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and built a
composite investor sentiment index in oil market using the trading volume of oil futures,
the historical volatility of the oil price, the put-call ratio of oil options, the ratio of
speculative traders to oil demand and stock index volatility. They found that sentiment
played an important role in explaining WTI and Brent prices using data from January
2002 to December 2013 based on a regression analysis. One of the main drawbacks for
this approach is that it treats oil prices as exogenous with respect to the global economy
and it is now generally accepted that crude oil prices are endogenous with respect to
the global macroeconomic conditions (see, for example, Barsky and Kilian, 2004). Han
5They used close-end fund discount, market turnover, number of IPOs, average ﬁrst day return on
IPOs, equity share of new issuances, and log diﬀerence in book-to-market ratios between dividend payers
and dividend non-payers.
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et al. (2017) constructed an investor attention index using the Google search volume
index based on a set of words related to oil-related variables and terms that are directly
linked to real economy to measure investor attention. They found that investor attention
provide signiﬁcant in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting power to forecast oil prices.
Given the earlier literature, our study extends the literature on the determinants of
oil prices for the following reasons. While previous studies focused on the traditional
fundamentals of supply and demand or the role of speculation, we account for economic
agents’ expectations of future economic conditions from business leaders, consumers and
markets’ points of view, respectively. Therefore, our empirical approach is able to account
for informational frictions faced by heterogeneous economic agents. Moreover, we use
a TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility that allows us to examine determinants
of shocks to oil market fundamentals and expectations over time and across economic
agents. We now turn to formally laying out our econometric methodology.
3 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we demonstrate how a standard Bayesian VAR model can be extended
to account for time-varying parameters (TVP) and used to examine the determinants of
oil prices. The TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility allows us to understand how
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and expectations aﬀect real oil prices over time.
3.1 Bayesian VAR Model
Our basic VAR model can be written as follows:
AYt = Σ
p
i=1 + ΓiYt−i + ut, t = p+ 1, ..., T (1)
where Yt is a K × 1 vector of endogenous variables includes the changes in the global
oil production (Δprodt), an index of global real economic activity (reat), the changes of
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economic agents’ expectations (Δexpt), and the real price of oil (rpot). Γi is a K × K
matrix of coeﬃcients, A is a K ×K matrix of contemporaneous coeﬃcient of Yt, and ut
captures the structural shocks in the commodity market and macroeconomic conditions.
We assume ut to be i.i.d. N(0,ΣΣ). The lag length is two (i.e. p = 2)
6 where Σ is the
diagonal matrix:
Σ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
σ1 0 . . . 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 σk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
To specify the simultaneous relations of the structural shock, we employ its reduced-form
representation by multiplying both sides by A−1, resulting in:
Yt = Σ
p
i=1BiYt−1 + A
−1Σεt, εt ∼ (0, Ik) (2)
where Bi = A
−1Γi for i = 1, ..., p. We can stack all the VAR coeﬃcients (Bi) into a
K2p × 1 vector to form B and deﬁne Xt = Ik ⊗ (Y ′t−1, ..., Y ′t−p), where ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product. We rewrite equation (2) as:
Yt = XtB + A
−1Σεt (3)
Note that the reduced-form residuals εt are correlated between each equation and can
be viewed as a weighted average of the structural shocks ut in equation (2). In order to
orthogonalize the shocks, we impose a recursive structure on the contemporaneous terms
6Most lag length speciﬁcation tests (e.g., Final Prediction Error; Akaike Information Criterion; and
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion) suggest that four lags should be included for our model with
quarterly data.
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and assuming that A is lower-triangular:
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 . . . . . . 0
a21
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
ak1 . . . ak1,k−1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The ordering of the variables is as follows: Yt = [Δprodt, reat,Δexpt, rpot]. The structural
shocks ut are identiﬁed by decomposing the reduced-form errors εt as follows:
ε =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
εΔprodt
εreat
εΔexpt
εrpot
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0
a21,t 1 0 0
a31,t a32,t 1 0
a41,t a42,t a43,t 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
usupplyt
udemandt
uexpt
urest
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
We disentangle four structural shocks that drive the real price of oil. Firstly, usupplyt
reﬂects an unexpected shift of global oil supply. These are not driven by changes in
the macroeconomic environment, but due to exogenous production disruptions due to
political instabilities, wars or changes in production quotas set by the OPEC members.
Secondly, udemandt captures the shift in the demand for all industrial commodities includ-
ing crude oil that is associated with unexpected ﬂuctuations in the global business cycle,
such as the unexpected strong demand from emerging economies. Next, uexpt reﬂects the
variations of speciﬁc economic agent’s (i.e., consumers, business leaders, and markets) ex-
pectations about future economic conditions. These expectations include sentiment from
diﬀerent agents about future economic trends. Sentiment may vary based upon elevated
risk or uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets, as in the global ﬁnancial crisis. Finally, urest
denotes the residual shock that captures idiosyncratic oil demand shocks not otherwise
accounted for. In Appendix A, we describe in detail the restrictions on A−1t that are
based on economic intuitions.
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Note that, we estimate the VAR model with Bayesian methods and adopt the inde-
pendent Normal-Wishart prior, which is more ﬂexible than the natural conjugate prior.
The prior distributions are described as:
B ∼ N(B, VB)
Σ−1 ∼ W (S−1, v)
where B = 0, VB = 10I4, S = I4, and v = 5 are as in Koop and Korobilis (2010). The
conditional posterior distributions p(B | Y,Σ−1) and p(Σ−1 | Y,B) are computed by the
MCMC method. Following Primiceri (2005), we use a training sample prior to obtain
the initial Σ−1. The training sample is the ﬁrst 40 observations (1974:Q4 to 1984:Q3).
Using the MCMC method, 100,000 samples are obtained after the initial 30,000 samples
are used as burn-in and discarded.
3.2 Time-varying Parameter VAR with Stochastic Volatility
Note that all parameters in equation (2) are time-invariant. Next, we adjust the model
by allowing these parameters to vary over time:
Yt = XtBt + A
−1
t Σtεt (4)
where the coeﬃcients Bt, and the parameters A
−1
t , and Σt are all time-varying. Time-
varying parameters allow the relationship between oil market fundamentals, expectations
and oil prices to evolve over time. Stochastic volatility allows for varying shock intensity
and improves estimation precision (see Nakajima et al., 2011). We follow Primiceri (2005)
and let at = (a21, a31, a32, a41, a42, a43)
′ be a stacked vector of the lower-triangular elements
in At and ht = (h1,t, ..., hk,t)
′ with hj,t = log σ2j,t, for j = 1, ..., k and σj,t is the diagonal
element of Σt. We assume that the parameters in (4) follow a driftless random walk
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process, thus allowing both temporary and permanent shift in the parameters:
Bt = Bt−1 + uB,t,
at = at−1 + ua,t,
ht = ht−1 + uh,t,
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
εt
uB,t
ua,t
uh,t
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
∼ N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0,
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 ΣB 0 0
0 0 Σa 0
0 0 0 Σh
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, t = 1, ..., T
The shocks to the innovations of the time-varying parameters are assumed uncorrelated
among the parameters Bt, at and ht. We further assume for simplicity that ΣB, Σa and
Σh are all diagonal matrices. Our dynamic speciﬁcation permits the parameters to vary
and the shock log variance follows a random walk process to capture possible gradual or
sudden structural changes, as discussed by Primiceri (2005).
For estimation, we employ a training sample prior, as shown in previous section and
the prior distributions are set as follows:
B0 ∼ N(BOLS, 4 · V (BOLS))
A0 ∼ N(AOLS, 4 · V (AOLS))
h0 ∼ N(hOLS, 4 · Ik)
where BOLS, AOLS, and hOLS denote the OLS point estimates and V (·) denotes the
variance. We also need to set the hyper-parameters ΣB, Σa, and Σh and we postulate
the following inverse-Wishart prior distributions:
ΣB ∼ IW (k2B · 40 · V (BOLS), 40)
Σa ∼ IW (k2a, 2)
Σ1,h ∼ IW (k2h · 2 · V (A1,OLS), 2)
Σ2,h ∼ IW (k2h · 3 · V (A1,OLS), 3)
Σ3,h ∼ IW (k2h · 3 · V (A1,OLS), 4)
where kB = 0.01, kα = 0.1, and kh = 1. Σ1,h, Σ2,h, and Σ3,h denote the three blocks of Σh
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and Aj,OLS for j = 1, ..., 3, denotes the three corresponding blocks of AOLS. Again the
estimation procedure is the MCMCmethod and the ﬁrst 30,000 samples are discarded and
100,000 samples are obtained for the inference. The details of the MCMC procedure for
TVP-VAR are explained by Primiceri (2005), Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Nakajima
et al. (2011).
4 Data
To carry out our investigation we use quarterly data and our sample period begins in
1974:Q4 and ends in 2016:Q1. As is well known, quarterly data are preferred when esti-
mating time-varying parameter models to keep estimation tractable. Indeed, TVP-VAR
estimation at a monthly frequency would require many lags to capture data dynamics,
and hence would be computationally intensive (see, among the others, Nakajima et al.,
2011).
In Table 1, we present the sources and deﬁnitions of the data used in this study. First
of all, we use the percentage change of global crude oil production (Δprodt) obtained by
the log diﬀerences of world crude oil production in millions per barrels pumped per day
(averaged by month). This data is obtained from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA). Secondly, as a proxy for global economic activity (reat), following Kilian (2009)
7
we use a measure constructed from an equal-weighted index of the percent growth rates of
a panel of single voyage bulk dry cargo ocean shipping freight rates measured in dollars
per metric ton. The rationale behind using this proxy is that increases in shipping
rates reﬂects changes in the global demand for industrial commodities, including that of
emerging countries such as China and India, given that supply of ocean-going vessels is
likely to be inelastic in the short-run.
Regarding our measures of economic agents’ expectations (Δexpt), we extract stan-
dardized and amplitude adjusted business conﬁdence indicators, consumer conﬁdence
7Data used in Kilian (2009) is available from Lutz Kilian’s homepage. The reader is referred to Kilian
(2009) for details on the construction of this index.
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indicators, and composite leading indicators for all OECD countries from the “OECD
Main Economic Indicators” database. The main advantage of obtaining these composite
indicators from the OECD is that they apply the same criteria to construct these indi-
cators across countries so that they are consistent and comparable. Firstly, we use the
OECD’s Business Conﬁdence Index (BCI) as a proxy for business leaders’ expectations.
This indicator combines a set of business tendency survey variables (e.g., the current
and immediate future expectations on production, orders and stocks) into a single com-
posite indicator that summarizes managers’ assessment and expectation of the general
economic situation. To capture consumers’ expectations, we make use of the OECD’s
Consumer Conﬁdence Index (CCI). Similar to BCI, CCI is based on information collected
from consumer opinion surveys regarding the households’ intensions for major purchases,
their current economic state as compared to the recent past and their expectations for
the immediate future (i.e., three months). The main characteristic of the business and
consumer surveys is that they ask for the direction of change by referencing to a normal
state. In translating these qualitative results into a time series, only the balance is shown
by taking the diﬀerence between percentages of respondents giving favourable and un-
favourable answers. Both BCI and CCI are expressed as an index (long-term average =
100) and they are seasonally adjusted. In addition, we use the Composite Leading Indi-
cator (CLI) to capture the aggregate perception of the business leaders and consumers on
the economic outlook. CLI is an aggregate time series which comprises a set of component
series selected from a wide range of key short-term economic indicators. Although the
underlying component series can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent countries depending on their
economic signiﬁcance, cyclical behaviour, data quality, timeliness and availability for the
speciﬁc country, the CLI is designed to capture turning points and moves in the same
directions as the business cycle.8
Our measure of the real oil price (rpot) is based on the Europe Brent spot price
8For detailed component series for each country, the reader is referred to the OECD Leading Indicators
webpage. For example, the component series used to construct the CLI for the UK are: business climate
indicator, new car registrations, consumer conﬁdence indicators, Sterling 3 month interbank lending rate,
production future tendency, FTSE-100 share price index.
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FOB which is expressed in US dollars per barrel. We use this series as the relevant
crude oil price for the world economy.9 The monthly series of the Brent crude oil price
obtained from the Datastream database is aggregated in quarterly terms and deﬂated
using the US consumer price index. Figure 2 depicts the behaviour and dynamics of
the price of Brent crude for the sample period 1985-2016. The graph shows that the oil
price seems sensitive to diﬀerent shocks, including changes in global crude oil production
due to political instabilities, changes in quotas or production policies, the discovery of
new oil ﬁelds, and the recent shale oil boom; and unexpected changes in the global
macroeconomic conditions such as the Asian crisis, unexpected strong demand for oil
from emerging markets from 2003 to 2008 and the global ﬁnancial crisis (e.g., Abhyankar
et al., 2013; Kilian, 2008; Kilian, 2016).
5 Empirical Discussion
In this section, we examine the relationships between oil price shocks, oil market fun-
damentals and economic agents’ expectations. Firstly, we present the impulse response
functions of oil prices based upon a standard Bayesian VAR (BVAR) model. Thereafter,
we investigate whether the VAR model is robust to time variation based upon ﬁndings
from our TVP-VAR model.
5.1 Impulse Responses from a BVAR Model
Figures 3 to 5 depict the impulse responses of oil prices to oil supply, aggregate demand
and expectations shocks over the full sample and two sub-sample periods corresponding to
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1) and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively. Our sample split relates
to the pattern of oil prices showing a moderate volatility of this series in S1 whereas,
evidently, during the period 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 sharp changes to oil prices have occurred
(see for example, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a). We present our results for a ten
9In the robustness checks section, we present the estimated results of our model using the US reﬁner
acquisition cost of imported crude oil; this does not qualitatively change our main conclusions.
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quarter response horizon. Our responses include the posterior median as the solid line,
while the dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution.10
We start by discussing the impulse responses functions (IRFs) of oil prices to oil mar-
ket fundamentals and business leaders’ expectation shocks (see Figure 3). The estimated
results for the full sample period are shown in the ﬁrst row. As we can see, an increase
in oil production does not aﬀect oil prices much since the zero axis is within the error
bands. This response can be interpreted as statistically insigniﬁcant within a frequentist
methodology. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the demand shocks have larger and more
persistent eﬀects. To be more speciﬁc, aggregate demand shocks caused by unexpected
increases in global demand for all industrial commodities lead to a persistent and signiﬁ-
cant increase in the real price of oil. The response reaches its peak after two quarters and
stabilizes soon after that. Our ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies such as Kilian
(2009) and Abhyankar et al. (2013) who also ﬁnd that supply played a less important role
on average in explaining the price movement in oil as compared to aggregate demand.
Furthermore, as we can see from the top right graph in Figure 3, a positive expectation
shock from business leaders’ expectations about the future economic conditions causes an
immediate increase in the real price of oil. Our ﬁndings are consistent with previous liter-
ature showing that survey-based sentiment indicators contain additional information on
the state of economy which is not already available in other standard economic indicators
(e.g., Ludvigson, 2004; Christiansen et al., 2014). In addition, Deeney et al. (2015), and
Han et al. (2017) found that market-based and text-based sentiment proxies played an
important role in modelling and forecasting the price of oil, respectively. The second and
third rows of Figure 3 display the median impulse responses of oil prices to oil supply,
aggregate demand and expectations shocks for subsamples S1 and S2. In general, we
observe an evolving relationship between the real price of oil, oil market fundamentals
and managers’ expectations. For example, we ﬁnd that the aggregate demand shocks and
expectation shocks played more important roles during the second sub-sample period as
10Under normality, the 16th and 84th percentiles correspond to the bounds of one-standard deviation
(Primiceri, 2005).
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compared to the ﬁrst subsample period.
Given that we are interested in ﬁnding out whether oil prices respond diﬀerently to
several economic agents’ expectations, now we replace the series of business conﬁdence
indicator in our BVAR model with the series of consumer conﬁdence indicator and com-
posite leading indicator over the full sample and the two subsamples S1 and S2 (see
Figures 4 and 5). As we can observe from the ﬁrst and second columns of Figures 4 and
5, the responses of oil prices to supply and demand shocks are similar to those in Figure
3. However, changes in consumers’ expectations with regards to future economic condi-
tions play a less important role as compared to business leaders’ expectations. This may
be explained by the fact that business leaders are generally better informed about the
prospects of the economy than consumers, because they focus on investment prospects
and future proﬁtability which are aﬀected by a large number of factors. Hence, managers
have better access to information and possibly a better understanding of economic news
and analyses (e.g., Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Delis et al., 2014; Caglayan and Xu, 2016).
The top right graph of Figure 5 gives the impact of aggregate markets expectations from
our OECD composite leading indicator (CLI). Raised expectations of the state of the
economy induce a positive rise in oil prices. In addition, when we split our samples into
two sub-periods, our estimated results indicate that the relationship between the real
price of oil, oil markets’ fundamentals and economic agents’ expectations have evolved
over time (see the second and third rows of Figures 4 and 5). This motivates the use of
a TVP-VAR which ﬁrstly does not assume the impact of fundamentals and expectations
are constant over time, and secondly, does not require us to exogenously ﬁx subsamples.
5.2 TVP-VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility
In this section, we focus upon the time evolution of the relationship between the real price
of oil, global oil production, aggregate real economic activity and expectations using a
TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility. Such an approach allows us to consider
the evolving impact of oil market fundamentals, as well as expectations which may be
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important when there are heightened informational frictions.
Figure 6 shows the contemporaneous time-varying impulse responses of oil prices to
positive shocks in oil supply, aggregate demand and expectations. In this ﬁgure the
posterior median is the solid line and the dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the posterior distribution. First, we ﬁnd that positive innovations to global oil supply
have a consistently negative impact on the real price of oil (see top panel of Figure 6). The
response of commodities to demand is consistently out-with the zero axis and hence can
be considered to be statistically signiﬁcant from a frequentist perspective. The eﬀect of
oil supply shocks on the real price of oil is evidently time-varying as we observe a smaller
response during the 1990’s and 2000’s as compared to the early years of our sample.
Only recently, with the beginning of the US oil shale revolution, the negative eﬀect of oil
supply shocks on the real price of oil has intensiﬁed again (Kilian, 2016). Our estimated
results are in contrast with the time-invariant studies, which have argued that oil supply
shocks have played a minor role in explaining oil price ﬂuctuations (e.g., Kilian, 2009;
Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kilian and Murphy, 2014).
Secondly, we ﬁnd that the real price of oil has responded positively to aggregate
demand shocks over the entire sample period based on upon the 16th and 84th percentiles
(see the middle panel of Figure 6). Our estimated results are in line with previous
studies showing that an expansion in the global economy increases demand for industrial
commodities and drives up oil prices (e.g., Kilian, 2008; Frankel, 2014). We also ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of real economic activity on oil prices is time-varying. In this regard, we
conﬁrm the ﬁndings by Kilian (2009) and Abhyankar et al. (2013) indicating that the
relationship between aggregate demand and the real price of oil was weaker during the
1980’s and the 1990’s whereas it has intensiﬁed in the mid-2000’s in correspondence with
the unexpected increase in demand from many emerging economies. The peak impact of
demand was around the global ﬁnancial crisis, but softened afterwards possibly due to
heightened risk and/or uncertainty about the global economy.
Using our more ﬂexible time-varying parameter methodology, the third shock to oil
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prices that we consider is that of business leaders’ expectations. Our estimated results
show that revised expectations regarding to the status of the economy from business
leaders have a substantial and positive impact upon oil prices, see the bottom panel of
Figure 6. The eﬀect is also very time-dependent, which is less evident from the constant
parameter results in Figure 3. The acutely time-varying impact is closely associated with
the Global Financial Crisis, during which uncertainty rose to the levels that have rarely
been seen since the Wall Street Crash. This led in 2008 to a full-blown banking crisis
following the failures of Lehman Brothers, and government takeovers of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and AIG (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). During the periods of severe
informational frictions led to confusion among market participants about the strength of
economies. In particular, from 2007 until the beginning of 2008 commodity price surged
due to the combination of strong demand from emerging economies and stagnant supply
by oil producers. However, oil prices continued to increase over 40% from January to July
2008 when many economies were showing signs of weaknesses. Therefore, our ﬁndings
suggest that expectations are useful to help to gauge global economic activity while
markets growth and hence global demand was diﬃcult to measure during the period of
heightened uncertainty of the global ﬁnancial crisis (see, Singleton, 2014; Sockin and
Xiong, 2015).
Next, we investigate to what extent oil price change in response to variations in diﬀer-
ent economic agents’ expectation on the state of the economy. In Figure 7, we report the
responses of the real price of oil to oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and unex-
pected changes in consumers’ expectations. The solid line in the ﬁgures is the posterior
median and the dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles. We immediately observe
the same responses of oil prices to supply and aggregate demand shocks as in Figure 6,
in which negative innovations to production and positive innovations to global economic
activity drive up the oil prices. However, we ﬁnd that positive shocks to consumers’
expectations on the economic outlook have a negative impact on oil prices. This result
can be explained by the fact that the consumer conﬁdence index is based on households’
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current and future economic conditions including their plans for major purchases (Lud-
vigson, 2004). Our ﬁndings are consistent with the literature on the cost channel that is
associated with higher oil prices (Kilian, 2008; Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). For example,
consumers may increase their precautionary savings and smooth their consumptions in
response to positive oil price shocks as they perceive a greater chance of future unem-
ployment; large oil price volatility can also raise uncertainties about future energy market
conditions and aﬀect consumers’ consumption and investment behaviour, often resulting
in reduced or postponed investments and purchases on goods and services. Our estimated
results suggest that an increase (deterioration, respectively) in consumers’ expectations
aﬀect the price of oil negatively (positively, respectively).
Figure 8 shows the estimated IRFs of oil prices in response to oil supply, aggregate
demand and market aggregate expectation shocks. We ﬁnd that the responses of the real
price of oil to both supply and aggregate demand shocks are similar to those in Figures
6 and 7. However, increases in market expectations aﬀect oil prices to a lesser extent
than before. This result can be explained by the nature of composite leading indicators
combining the expectations of business leaders and consumers. As we have seen in Figures
6 and 7 these shocks have opposite eﬀects on oil prices. As a consequence, the response
of the real oil price to changes in aggregate expectation played a less important role.
In sum, our empirical ﬁndings highlight the importance for allowing heterogeneous
expectations across economic agents (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). Our results also
consistent with the arguments from Morris and Shin (2002) and Sockin and Xiong (2015)
that there may be greater complementarity between oil prices and ﬁrms’ productions than
households’ consumptions, when the oil price increases in the presence of informational
frictions represents a rise in global demand. Hence, ﬁrms beneﬁt more from news about
positive global demand, rather than the cost eﬀects of increased oil prices. For example,
good producers continued to increase their demand for commodities despite the high
commodity prices from January to July 2008. On the other hand, consumers may have
less complementarity between oil prices and consumption, since households’ individual
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consumption decisions are less aﬀected by global demand and more impacted by the cost
channel of increased oil prices.
5.3 Robustness Checks
We now report some robustness checks for our TVP-VAR model, and report most of the
results in Appendix B. First, we focus on the series of the oil price. In particular, many
previous studies analysing the determinants of oil price ﬂuctuations have used the series
US reﬁner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (see, for example, Barsky and Kilian,
2004; Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012). Therefore, we re-estimate our models by
replacing the series of the Europe Brent spot price with this series. Figure B1 suggests
that the responses of oil prices to oil supply, aggregate demand and expectations shocks
are in line with those reported in Figures 6-8. Second, we show that our assumptions
about the identiﬁcation order do not inﬂuence the main empirical ﬁndings. Figure B2
shows that the directions of the responses to the structural shocks are qualitatively similar
when we placed the economic agents’ expectations ﬁrst in equation ((4)). Finally, we
replace the economic agents’ expectations emanated from all OECD countries to the
US market only. The estimated impulse response functions of oil prices to oil market
fundamentals and expectations shocks are shown in online Appendix Figure B3. Again,
this does not qualitatively change our main ﬁndings.
6 Conclusion
Modelling oil price movements is important to many decision makers in macroeconomic
policy, capital investment/production decisions, consumption, risk and portfolio man-
agement. The oil price is considered as an important barometer for the global economy
(Sockin and Xiong, 2015; Ravazzolo and Philip, 2016). For example, changes in oil prices
help to predict GDP ﬂuctuations, and often central banks take explicit account of the
volatility of oil price in setting monetary policy. Morris and Shin (2002) set out why noise
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in public information has an ampliﬁed eﬀect on agents’ actions. Oil prices can play an
important role in feeding back news to, and aﬀecting the investment decisions of, a wide
range of agents and industries. Oil prices can also aﬀect the design of regulatory policies
such as the imposition of automotive fuel standards or gasoline taxes, environmental poli-
cies in reducing carbon emissions and climate change. For instance, energy companies
decision to expand oil and gas exploration, or invest in renewable energy technologies. It
also has important implications for the economic viability of the production of shale oil
and biofuels, which directly aﬀects the energy security of the oil-importing countries.
Our paper extends the topical literature on identifying the determinants of oil prices,
by emphasising the role of informational frictions and expectations. Our research relates
to work in behavioural ﬁnance and psychology, which argues that human behaviour and
ﬁnancial markets respond diﬀerently in times of heightened fear and uncertainty. Our in-
vestigation focuses upon expectations from three sources: business leaders, consumers and
markets. Oil price may not fully reﬂect fundamentals since agents can have severe infor-
mational frictions. In this context expectations impact oil prices, although the source of
these expectations matters. Another innovation in this paper is the application of a TVP-
VAR model with stochastic volatility to ﬂexibly delineate the impact of fundamentals and
economic agents’ expectations. This approach allows all parameters to evolve continu-
ously, informing us when, and to what extent, there is a change over time in the impact of
oil price determinants. This is rather than imposing an arbitrary sample split to account
for changing price dynamics. Our model also allows for time-varying heteroskedasticity
in the VAR innovations to account for changes in the magnitude of shocks. This feature
is especially important given abrupt changes in volatility between the Great Moderation
and Global Financial Crisis (Primiceri, 2005; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013a).
Our results show that supply shocks arising from unexpected global oil production
changes negatively aﬀect the real price of oil. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of production on
oil prices is time-varying. For instance, the negative eﬀects of oil supply shocks have
intensiﬁed recently, which may account for the US shale oil boom. We identify that since
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the middle of the 2000’s, oil prices respond positively to unexpected increases in demand,
for example from emerging economies since the mid-2000’s. Furthermore, we discover
that the real price of oil responds diﬀerently to expectations that arise from business
leaders, consumers and aggregate markets. Increases in business leaders’ expectations
have a more positive impact upon the real price of oil than due to aggregate markets’
expectations. Additionally, unexpected increases in consumers’ expectation negatively
aﬀect the real price of oil, if at all.
In sum, our empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that there is non-constant
relationship between oil prices and global demand, partly because this link is masked by
informational frictions. This implies that the oil price itself may be a useful signal of global
economic activity for policy makers and market participants. Regulators might consider
how their policies (e.g., capital and asset allocation, taxes, and environmental policies)
might be perceived by mangers and households. For market participants, our results
suggest that one need to take account of heterogeneous beliefs from economic agents’
perception on the future economic conditions, and their impact on oil prices to set up
their decision (e.g., capital investment, productions, consumptions, risk management, and
trading strategies). Moreover, informational frictions and expectations may be important
for other commodity prices, such as metals and agricultural price. We shall leave these
issues for future work.
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Figure 1: Time Series proxies Economic Agents Expectations
Notes: This ﬁgure contains time series data including business expectations as proxied by OECD Business
Conﬁdence Index (BCI). Consumer expectations are proxied by Consumer Conﬁdence Index (CCI).
Finally we proxy market analysts expectations using Composite Leading Indicators (CLI).
Source: OECD Monthly Main Economic Indicators Database.
Figure 2: Europe Brent Spot Crude Price FOB
Notes: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (US dollars per barrel) and major oil price episodes.
Source: Datastream database.
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Figure 3: BVAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Business Leaders
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and business conﬁdence indicator (BCI). The ﬁrst row reports the IRFs for the full sample
period (1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1), and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 4: BVAR Impulse Responses of the Real Price of Oil under Consumers
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and consumer conﬁdence indicator (CCI). The ﬁrst row reports the IRFs for the full sample
period (1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples
1974:Q4-1998:Q4 (S1), and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 5: BVAR Impulse Responses of the Real Price of Oil under Markets Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and composite leading indicator (CLI). The ﬁrst row reports the IRFs for the full sample period
(1974:Q4-2016:Q1) whereas, the second and third rows report the IRFs for two sub-samples 1974:Q4-
1998:Q4 (S1), and 1999:Q1-2016:Q1 (S2), respectively.
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Figure 6: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Business Leaders
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and business conﬁdence indicator (BCI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model in
equation (4). Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the
full sample period.
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Figure 7: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Consumers
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and consumer conﬁdence indicator (CCI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model in
equation (4). Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the
full sample period.
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Figure 8: TVP-VAR Impulse Responses of Real Price of Oil under Markets
Expectations
Notes: In each graph solid lines represent the median responses whereas dashed lines indicate the 16th
and 84th percentiles error bands. We consider three diﬀerent shocks to oil prices: oil supply, aggregate
demand and composite leading indicator (CLI). The estimates are based on the TVP-VAR model in
equation (4). Each panel measures how a unit impulse of several shocks impacts the oil price over the
full sample period.
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Table 1: Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
Variable Data Series Deﬁnition Sources of Data
Percentage
change in
global oil pro-
duction
Global Oil Pro-
duction
World crude oil production in
millions per barrels pumped
per day (averaged by month).
Energy Informa-
tion Administra-
tion, Monthly En-
ergy Review
Global real eco-
nomic activity
Single-voyage
freight rates
See Kilian (2009) for detailed
information on how to con-
struct this series.
Lutz Kilians
homepage:
http://www-
personal.umich.edu/ lk-
il-
ian/reaupdate.txt.
Economic
Agents Expec-
tations
Business Conﬁ-
dence Indicator
(BCI)
BCI is a composite indicator
that summarizes managers’
assessments and expectations
of the general economic situa-
tion.
OECD Monthly
Main Eco-
nomic Indicators
database.
Consumer Conﬁ-
dence Indicator
(CCI)
CCI include indicators on con-
sumer conﬁdence, expected
economic situation and price
expectations.
Composite Lead-
ing Indicator
(CLI)
CLI is an aggregate time se-
ries displaying a reasonably
consistent leading relationship
with the reference series (e.g.,
industrial production up to
March 2012 and GDP after-
wards) for the macroeconomic
cycle in a country. CLI is
designed to provide early sig-
nals of turning points between
expansions and slowdowns of
economic activity.
Real oil Price Europe Brent
spot price FOB
The original series is aggre-
gated in quarterly terms and
deﬂated using the US CPI.
DataStream
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Appendix A: Identiﬁcation Assumptions
Our restrictions on A−1t are based on the following assumptions and economic intuitions.
The ﬁrst assumption is that global crude oil supply does not respond to the demand
shocks in the crude oil market immediately, but does so with a delay of at least a quarter.
This is plausible since making changes in oil production are costly in the short-run and oil
producers therefore base their production plans on expectations of medium-term demand
(see e.g., Hamilton, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012).
The second assumption is that increases in the real price of oil driven by expectation
demand shocks and oil-market speciﬁc demand shocks do not aﬀect global economic ac-
tivity immediately. This assumption is based upon Stock and Watson (2005), who have
classiﬁed the series into slow-moving variables, such as real output; and fast-moving vari-
ables such as stock prices, money and credit. Global real economic activity is considered
slow-moving: it is plausible that consumers and ﬁrms slowly revise their spending plans
after ﬁnancial market shocks or expectation shocks.
Our third restriction implies that changes to economic agents’ expectations are prede-
termined with respect to oil prices. This assumption is related to informational frictions
that in our empirical framework are captured by agents expectations. The best exam-
ple to explain our argument relates to the commodity price boom of 2007 to 2008. In
particular, from 2007 until the beginning of 2008 commodity prices skyrocketed due to
the combination of strong demand from emerging economies and stagnant supply by oil
producers. However, oil prices continued to increase from January to July 2008 at a time
when the US had already entered a recession in November 2017 and many developing
economies were showing signs of weakness. At the same time a large investment ﬂow led
goods producers to believe that developing economies were stronger than they actually
were. Therefore, goods producers continued to increase their demand for commodities
despite the high commodity prices. We believe that this episode allows us to rule out
the instantaneous feedback from real oil prices to global economic agents’ expectations
38
without loss of generality.
Finally, shocks to the real oil price that are not explained by oil supply shocks or
aggregate demand shocks by construction reﬂect changes in the demand for oil in contrast
to changes in the demand for all industrial commodities. We deﬁne these shocks as oil
market-speciﬁc demand shocks. In particular, these shocks represent the ﬂuctuations in
precautionary demand for oil due to uncertain future oil supply.
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